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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ABBREVIATIONS
The question whether, and under what circumstances, an
abbreviation1 for a generic2 or merely descriptive term qualifies for
∗ IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Works in
Progress Intellectual Property (WIPIP) Colloquium, held at the Tulane University School of Law.
The author would like to thank the participants in that colloquium for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. In general, the analysis in this article does not distinguish between initials and other forms
of abbreviations. While the nature of a particular abbreviation will certainly affect the outcome of
the trademark analysis in any given case, the same general analytical questions arise. Terminology
is not always consistently used in the relevant case law. The term “abbreviations” covers the
broadest category, referring to any shortening of a word or phrase. The rarely-used term
“initialisms” refers to abbreviations made up of the first letters of all or most words in a phrase. The
more common term “acronym,” in its narrowest sense, refers to a subset of initialisms which are
pronounced as words (e.g., LASIK, NATO, BEARS), unlike ordinary initialisms which are
pronounced as a series of letters (AARP, AAA, SSRN, DVD). Some terms which originated as
acronyms are today recognized as ordinary words (e.g., scuba, laser, radar, sonar). Some initialisms
have sprouted word equivalents based on their pronunciation (e.g., deejay, tee-shirt, emcee).
However, many courts use the term “acronyms” in a broader sense, as a synonym for initialisms.
Even more detailed distinctions can be drawn among various categories of initialisms, as illustrated
by the Wikipedia entry on acronyms and initialisms. See Acronym and initialism, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acronym (last modified Aug. 24, 2011). While the same general
analytical questions arise in determining whether an abbreviation of any of these types qualifies for
trademark protection, the nature of the particular abbreviation in question may affect the outcome of
the trademark analysis in any given case.
2. Generic terms are not eligible for protection as trademarks. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810
(2d Cir. 1999); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976);
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trademark protection has produced a surprising variety of juristic
responses. Many courts ask whether, in the minds of the public, the
abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying words;
however, courts have expressed the necessary degree of distinction in
different ways and have entertained widely varying presumptions with
respect to consumer perceptions. As a result, the federal courts impose
inconsistent burdens on the party seeking protection for a trademark that
takes the form of an abbreviation. Other courts do not inquire as to
consumer perceptions at all, and have instead adopted per se rules
categorically holding such abbreviations to be either inherently
distinctive or unprotectable at all.
In this jungle of irreconcilable doctrines, the Second Circuit, which
ordinarily plays a leadership role in trademark jurisprudence, has issued
inconsistent and poorly explained rulings, and as a result had little
influence on doctrinal development, and the Federal Circuit, in its
modern incarnation, has contributed nothing at all. The most influential
and well-considered doctrine has emerged from two sources—the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) (one of the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor courts) and the Seventh Circuit. Because these precedents
conflict—with the CCPA’s approach favoring trademark owners, and
the Seventh Circuit’s approach disfavoring them—other federal courts
have faced a choice between opposing approaches, and in some cases
have developed their own approaches. Unfortunately, not all of the
juristic approaches have involved careful analysis, and a number of
courts have adopted per se rules that automatically favor or disfavor
trademark owners, with no serious inquiry into the source-identifying
capacity of the marks.
This article compares the approaches which different federal courts
have adopted to address the distinctiveness of abbreviations where the
underlying expression or information conveyed by the abbreviation is

Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 847 (C.C.P.A.1961); J.
Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960). “This rule protects the
interest of the consuming public in understanding the nature of goods offered for sale, as well as a
fair marketplace among competitors by insuring that every provider may refer to his goods as what
they are.” Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999)
(citing CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.)
(“To allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names which describe the genus of goods
being sold [is impermissible because] a competitor could not describe his goods as what they are.”)
(citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15cmt. b (“A seller
. . . cannot remove a generic term from the public domain and cast upon competitors the burden of
using an alternative name.”)); John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-onCompetition Test, 51 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 868 (1984).
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unprotectable either because it is generic or because it is descriptive and
lacks secondary meaning. While this study is not intended as a
comprehensive survey, it is designed to highlight the inconsistencies in
approaches. The article concludes with some observations about the
patterns and trends emerging from the unsettled decisional law.
II. THE EVOLVING LAW BY JURISDICTION
A.

The PTO and CCPA Approach

Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and
the PTO have generally focused on whether the abbreviation has the
same significance to the relevant consumers as the underlying phrase.
For example, in Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine,3
the CCPA held that a mark consisting predominantly of the abbreviation
“B and B” could not be registered as a trademark for a bottled beverage
consisting of Benedictine and brandy. Because both parties agreed “that
the notation ‘B and B’ is a designation of Benedictine and brandy in
equal parts and that the designation has been popularly and exclusively
so used in the United States for approximately thirty years,” the court
held that “the term is necessarily descriptive of the said goods.”4
In Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp.,5 the PTO
Commissioner upheld the refusal to register “C.R.A.,” an abbreviation
for the generic term “cutting room appliances,” as a trademark for
various devices used in cutting rooms of clothing manufacturers. The
Commissioner held that “‘C.R.A.,’ when displayed in association with
applicant’s name, can have no other meaning than ‘cutting room
appliances;’ and . . . applicant in its advertising has assiduously taught
the public to regard the mark as having that significance.”6 Because the
evidence indicated that “C.R.A.” had “the same significance in the
trade” as the underlying generic phrase, it was ineligible for
registration.7
Opinions of the CCPA consistently recognized that not all
abbreviations for generic or descriptive terms are themselves generic or
descriptive, as exemplified by the influential decision in Modern Optics
3. Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, 116 F.2d 516, 519 (C.C.P.A.
1941).
4. Id.
5. Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 4 (Com’r Pat. &
Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943).
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
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v. Univis Lens Co.8 Modern Optics concerned the initials “CV,”
standing for “continuous vision,” a term which itself was either
descriptive or suggestive (a question the court did not decide) as applied
to trifocal eyeglass lenses.9 The CCPA held that “CV” was not itself
descriptive for these lenses because there was insufficient evidence that
CV was “a generally recognized term for multifocal lenses and lens
blanks.”10 While noting that it was “possible for initial letters to become
so associated with descriptive words as to become descriptive
themselves,”11 the court held: “It does not follow, however, that all
initials of combinations of descriptive words are ipso facto
unregistrable.”12
The court distinguished “CV” from other
abbreviations, such as those in Martell and Breth, which had, in the
minds of consumers, become synonymous with their underlying generic
phrases:
While each case must be decided on the basis of the particular facts
involved, it would seem that, as a general rule, initials cannot be
considered descriptive unless they have become so generally
understood as representing descriptive words as to be accepted as
substantially synonymous therewith.13

Although Modern Optics did not expressly articulate the burden of proof
or persuasion, the emphasized language implies that the party
challenging the abbreviation’s trademark status bears the burden of
establishing that consumers assign a descriptive meaning to the
abbreviation. The factual record in Modern Optics was mixed in this
regard; while some consumers viewed CV as a generic term, the
evidence was insufficient to establish that this perception was the rule
rather than the exception.14
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has consistently
followed the Modern Optics15 approach, focusing on whether consumers
perceive the abbreviation itself as having generic or descriptive meaning,

8. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
9. Id. at 505.
10. Id. at 506.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, 116
F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1941) and Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46
(Com’r Pat. & Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943)).
14. Id. at 506.
15. Id. at 504.
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regardless of how they perceive the underlying phrase.16 The TTAB has
explicitly stated that the question whether initials are generic is distinct
from the question whether the words they stand for are generic.17
16. T.T.A.B. decisions refusing trademark protection for abbreviations include: In re Finisar
Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“SFP” is a common abbreviation for “small
form-factor pluggable” as applied to optical transceivers); Capital Project Mngt., Inc., v. IMDISI,
Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1182-83 (T.T.A.B. 2003) (relevant consumers equated “TIA” with
underlying generic phrase “time impact analysis”); Cont’l Airlines Inc. v. United Air Lines Inc., 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (refusing registration for “e-ticket” because public
understood the term as referring to generic category of electronic ticketing services); In re Unif.
Prod. Code Council, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 618 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (refusing service mark
registration for “UPC,” an abbreviation for “Universal Product Code,” because applicant (a
consortium) used both terms as common descriptive names for machine-readable product codes on
product packaging); Southwire Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566
(T.T.A.B. 1977) (as perceived by persons in industry, “ALR” is descriptive for electrical wire,
because it stands for “aluminum revised”); In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (“rf” is descriptive for radio transmitters, receivers and parts because it is a
recognized abbreviation for “radio frequency”); Intel Corp. v. Radiation Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
54 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (“PROM” is merely descriptive as applied to programmable read only
memories); El Paso Prods. Co. v. C.P. Hall Co., 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413-14 (T.T.A.B. 1973)
(“‘DMG’ is recognized or would be recognized and referred to by the average purchaser of dimethyl
glutarate as the apt and common descriptive abbreviation for the product rather than as a trademark
serving to identify and distinguish the dimethyl glutarate produced and/or marketed by any one
person.”); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Borden Co., 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153, 154 (T.T.A.B. 1967)
(“‘HOMO’ is merely a recognized abbreviation for the word homogenized and has been so used
both by opposer and others in the dairy industry. As such, it cannot function as a trademark for
homogenized milk. . . ”); In re Initial Teaching Alphabet Publ’ns, Inc., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 684
(T.T.A.B. 1967) (letters “‘i.t.a.’ have a commonly recognized meaning in applicant’s particular
field” as an abbreviation for “initial teaching alphabet”); Burroughs Corp. v. Microcard Reader
Corp., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (refusing registration for “MICR” for machines
used for viewing magnetic ink characters because “MICR” was used in electronics and banking
industries as an abbreviation for and interchangeably with “magnetic ink character recognition”);
and In re Gen. Aniline & Film Corp., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (“PVP” was
unregistrable for polyvinylpyrrolidone because it was the “accepted abbreviation” for this synthetic
material).
T.T.A.B. decisions holding abbreviations protectable as trademarks include: Racine Indus.
Inc. v. Bane-Clene Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1838 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (although
“Professional Cleaners Association” is descriptive or generic, “PCA” is not understood by the
relevant public as synonymous therewith) (citing Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504); Sbs Prods. Inc. v.
Sterling Plastic & Rubber Prods. Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147, 1149 n.6 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (“SBS”
is not a weak mark even though derived from the initials of “stuffing box sealant” or “sugar beet
soap,” absent a showing that these letters are recognized abbreviations for those products); Aloe
Creme Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (despite phonetic
equivalence, “ALO” was not generic for opposer’s products made with aloe, because it had acquired
secondary meaning among customers); In re Pac. Indus., Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 704 (T.T.A.B.
1970) (because purchasers recognized “EDP” as source indicator for applicant’s carbon paper, it can
be registered even though the initials may stand for “electronic data processing” or “extra data printout”); In re U.S. Catheter & Instrument Corp., 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (where
record failed to indicate that “NBIH” possessed any known meaning for purchasers of applicant’s
medical devices, initials were eligible for registration on principal register); Nife, Inc. v. GouldNat’l Batteries, Inc., 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 454-55 (T.T.A.B. 1961) (“The record is wholly
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In its most recent application of Modern Optics, the TTAB was
asked in In re Thomas Nelson, Inc.,18 to determine whether “NKJV” was
merely descriptive of the applicant’s bibles because the initials stand for
the descriptive term “New King James Version.” The Board outlined a
three-step inquiry:
(1) Whether “NKJV” is an abbreviation for “New King James
Version”;
(2) Whether “New King James Version” is merely descriptive of
bibles; and
(3) Whether a relevant consumer viewing “NKJV” in connection with
bibles would recognize it as an abbreviation for “New King James
Version.”19

The Board derived this inquiry from its 1984 decision in In re Harco
Corp.,20 where it held that “CPL” (standing for “computerized potential
log”) was arbitrary, even though the underlying phrase was descriptive,
because there was no “convincing evidence” that persons coming into
contact with the applicant’s services would perceive “CPL” as “no more
than” an abbreviation for the underlying descriptive phrase.21 Thus, the
Board in Harco placed the burden of proof squarely on the Examining
Attorney rather than the applicant, and required the Examining Attorney
to show not only that consumers recognized what “CPL” stood for, but
also to show that they perceived it as “no more than” an abbreviation for
the underlying descriptive term.22 In contrast, the Board’s decision in
Nelson did not expressly discuss the burden of proof.23 Furthermore, in
its analysis of the third inquiry, the Board imposed a lower burden of
proof on the Examiner, requiring proof only that consumers “would
recognize” NKJV as an abbreviation, rather than requiring proof, as in
Harco, that consumers perceived it as “no more than” an abbreviation.24
insufficient to show that ‘NICAD’ is an abbreviation, contraction or foreshortening for nickel
cadmium and is commonly used in the trade and by purchasers in lieu of the complete words in
referring to nickel cadmium batteries. To the contrary, the record tends to indicate that ‘NICAD’ is
used and recognized as the trademark for applicant's nickel cadmium batteries.”).
17. See Capital Project Mgmt., Inc., v. IMDISI, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1179
(T.T.A.B. 2003) (“[W]e must examine whether the letters ‘TIA’ are generally recognized and used
in the construction field as an accepted abbreviation for ‘time impact analysis.’”) (citing Modern
Optics, 234 F.2d 504).
18. In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
19. Id. at *5.
20. In re Harco Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1075 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Nelson, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712.
24. Id. at *6; Harco, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1076.
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Accordingly, while there is some variation in the standard of proof
required by the TTAB, the Board has consistently followed Modern
Optics25 in requiring the PTO to establish that consumers perceive the
abbreviation itself as a descriptive term.
B.

In the Circuits

Outside of the CCPA, courts have taken divergent approaches to
analyzing the distinctiveness of abbreviations. As discussed below,
while some courts have adopted an analysis consistent with the CCPA
and TTAB approaches as exemplified by Modern Optics,26 others have
placed significantly greater—and sometimes insurmountable—burdens
on parties seeking to protect abbreviations of generic or descriptive
terms; still others have adopted per se rules either favoring or
disfavoring the trademark owner. Only in a small minority of cases have
these courts offered persuasive reasoning to justify the rules they have
adopted.
Many appellate courts have avoided discussing the issue by
affirming district court decisions without issuing opinions, or by issuing
perfunctory memorandum opinions. Thus, while federal case law on this
topic goes back at least as far as 1924, relatively few appellate decisions
provide substantive analyses of the issues. But the few appellate
opinions, together with the larger number of district court opinions,
reveal a surprising range of disagreement on the proper approach to
abbreviations. Furthermore, even though there is a substantial body of
CCPA and TTAB precedents available for guidance, these authorities
have been largely ignored by the district and appellate courts.
1. Second Circuit: Turn, and Turn Again27
Although the Second Circuit is one of the most influential
jurisdictions in trademark jurisprudence, the decisions of its courts on
the distinctiveness of abbreviations have been inconsistent and not
entirely coherent. Very few opinions have been issued at the appellate
level and, as discussed below, those opinions have largely been ignored
by the district courts.
The pre-Lanham Act opinion in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler28
provided a generous degree of protection to the “V-8” mark for the
25.
26.
27.
28.
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plaintiff’s vegetable juice product. The Second Circuit held that the
mark was “arbitrary and fanciful,” even though many consumers were
aware that the product consisted of eight vegetable juices, and probably
understood “V-8” as a shorthand reference to that fact:
Yet we agree with the court below that the mark is a non-descriptive
one when used on the container of a vegetable juice cocktail. The
letter V by itself no more signifies ‘vegetable’ than it does any other
word of which it is the initial letter and it is only when resort is had to
other parts of the label that one may glean that it stands for ‘vegetable.’
As much is true of the figure 8, and when put together as they are in
the mark they are only an arbitrary and fanciful symbol chosen to
designate the plaintiff’s vegetable juice cocktail. This mark has
become the distinctive name of that cocktail not because it is
inherently descriptive of anything but because it has been so used that
it has become associated in the public mind as the banner of that
product. That does not make the mark descriptive but is only evidence
of the effectiveness of its use. By repeatedly advertising the fact that
its cocktail is made of the combined juices of eight vegetables, the
plaintiff has undoubtedly taught the purchasing public that V-8 on a tin
can means such a cocktail. Except for this association, we think, no
one could reasonably be expected to know that ‘V-8’ designated a
vegetable juice cocktail, or any other particular thing for that matter,
unless it be something so described by both shape and number, like an
eight cylinder automobile engine, for instance, having cylinder[s] set at
an acute angle to each other.29

This case stands in sharp contrast to later decisions in the Seventh30 and
Eleventh31 Circuits, which found abbreviations to be descriptive where
the merchant’s packaging or marketing materials conveyed (or might in
the future convey) to consumers the descriptive aspects of the
abbreviation. However, the opinion appears to have had no influence on
subsequent Second Circuit case law regarding abbreviations.
In 1961, the Second Circuit held in Blisscraft of Hollywood v.
United Plastics Co.,32 that “Poly” could be protected as a common law
mark for polyester pitchers, because the defendant provided insufficient
evidence that the relevant purchasing public equated the term with
polyethylene (and thus that the mark was descriptive). The court
reached this conclusion in spite of evidence showing that the plaintiff’s

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 36.
See infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 166-212 and accompanying text.
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
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advertising informed consumers that its “Poly Pitcher” and its entire line
of “Poly Ware” were made of polyethylene.33 The court noted that the
dictionary meaning of “poly” has nothing to do with polyethylene,34 and
that the word was also “reminiscent or suggestive of Molly Pitcher of
Revolutionary time.”35 However, this was uniquely true of the “Poly
Pitcher” product, and completely inapplicable to the other products in
the “Poly Ware” line. Furthermore, the court did not consider the fact
that a consumer’s inclination to pronounce “Poly” so as to rhyme with
“Molly” (as opposed to rhyming with “holy”) might be based in part on
that consumer’s recognition that “Poly” was short for “polyester”
(although the consumer might not be fully conscious of making that
association).36
Without considering these potential flaws in its
reasoning, the court concluded that “Poly Pitcher” was “an incongruous
expression,” having “the characteristics of a coined or fanciful mark.”37
Blisscraft38 could be viewed as consistent with the Modern Optics39
approach, because, however flawed its analysis, the court at least
considered how consumers actually perceived the term “Poly.”
On the heels of Blisscraft40, a district court in Connecticut expressly
relied on Modern Optics41 in holding that the registered mark “hi-g” was
descriptive for devices designed to withstand a high multiple of
gravitational force. The court in General Controls Co. v. Hi-G, Inc.
observed:
The parties agree that the letter ‘g’ is a well-known abbreviation or
symbol for the forces of gravity and acceleration. ‘Hi-g’ is commonly
used to express a high multiple of gravitational force which may range
from a fraction of a ‘g’ up into the hundreds. The abbreviation of
‘high’ to ‘hi’ when hyphenated to ‘g’ is a combination so widely

33. Id. at 701-02.
34. “Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958) defines ‘poly’ as ‘consisting of
many,’ ‘a plurality,’ ‘a number above the normal.’ In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
we cannot assume that to members of the public at large the word ‘poly,’ either alone or in
combination with ‘pitcher,’ had any meaning other than that attributed to it by the lexicographer.”
Id. at 699.
35. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d at 700.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d 694.
39. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
40. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d 694.
41. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504.
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associated with high gravity as to be generally accepted as a
contraction.42

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s advertisements had educated its customers
about the meaning of “hi-g” for nearly two decades.43
In contrast to these two early precedents, two subsequent decisions
from the Southern District of New York are clearly at odds with Modern
Optics44 and take the position that initials are inherently descriptive.
These cases are Programmed Tax Systems, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.
(involving “P.T.S.” for “programmed tax systems”)45 and American
Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., Inc. (involving “AO” for
“American Optical”).46 Both decisions involved initials rather than
shortened forms of longer words, such as “Poly.” In each case, the court
seemed to state that initials by their very nature cannot be inherently
distinctive. American Optical held that “[t]he initials ‘AO’ are letters in
the alphabet available for use by everyone,” and “[t]here is nothing
about those initials to conjure up instantaneously the plaintiff.”47 In
Programmed Tax Systems, the court was even blunter: “Combinations
of letters of the alphabet are readily available for use by anyone and are
merely descriptive.”48 Because all word marks are made up of letters of
the alphabet (or sometimes numbers), this statement is absurd. Neither
opinion explained why letters of the alphabet should be treated
differently from words in a dictionary, which, depending on context, can
be arbitrary or suggestive as well as descriptive or generic. In neither
case did the court consider the Second Circuit’s Blisscraft49 precedent,
probably because that case did not involve initials. Furthermore, neither
of these cases considered how the initials were actually perceived by the
relevant consumers, whether those consumers typically encountered the
initials together with the underlying expressions, or the degree of
distinctiveness in the underlying expressions.
Still later, the Southern District of New York appears to have
abandoned the “inherently descriptive” rule for initials and reverted to an

42. Gen. Controls Co. v. Hi-G, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1962) (citing
Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504).
43. Id. at 156.
44. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504 .
45. Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
46. Am. Optical Corp. v. Am. Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
47. Id. at 409.
48. Programmed Tax Sys., 419 F. Supp. at 1253.
49. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
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approach resembling Modern Optics50 and Blisscraft51 (although it failed
to mention either case). In its 1985 opinion in Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc.
v. Newman Investment Securities, Inc.,52 the Southern District held that
the acronym “TOP’s” could be a valid trademark even though it stood
for the generic term “tender option program.” The court noted that some
abbreviations can be arbitrary or fanciful, while acknowledging that
“commonly understood abbreviations” might be descriptive or generic.53
Why the change of heart? Was the Merritt Forbes54 court
influenced by the fact that “TOP’s” was an acronym—and thus
pronounceable as a word, like “Poly”—rather than an unpronounceable
initialism like “P.T.S.” or “AO”?
In the interim, the Eastern District had also weighed in with two
opinions on marks that, while combining letters and numbers, could be
considered to be abbreviations in the sense that they summarized
information that would otherwise be communicated in lengthier
expressions. Nature’s Bounty, Inc. v. Basic Organics55 held that the
mark “B-100” was descriptive as applied to a vitamin containing 100
milligrams of vitamin B. Because it had become commonplace for
vitamin companies to identify single-entity vitamins by the letter name
of the vitamin plus its potency, the court observed, “the public now
assumes it is buying 100 milligrams of a vitamin B complex when it sees
a vitamin marked with B-100. B-100 was a term coined by plaintiff, but
it is now associated with the product.”56 Shortly thereafter, in Nature’s
Bounty, Inc. v. SuperX Drugs Corp.,57 the same court held that the
registered mark “KLB 6” was probably suggestive rather than
descriptive for a food supplement containing kelp, lecithin, and vitamin
B6.58 The court noted that it would probably have reached this
conclusion even without the presumption of validity arising from
registration,59 and distinguished its earlier holding that “B-100” for a
single-entity vitamin was merely descriptive:
In the absence of evidence as to actual customer reactions, the acronym
“KLB 6” appears more suggestive of the nature of the goods than
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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descriptive of the three nutritional ingredients contained therein. The
conclusion that KLB 6 is suggestive is strengthened by the fact that
none of the products introduced as exhibits list the ingredients in the
order suggested by the designation “KLB 6.” . . .The use of an
acronym referring to an admixture of not wholly familiar ingredients
distinguishes this trademark from that used in connection with another
Nature's Bounty product, “B-100,” a mark held by Judge Neaher to be
merely descriptive of 100 milligrams of vitamin B and, therefore, not
entitled to protection against infringement.60

The court also noted that the defendant had “not demonstrated that
acronyms are commonly used as generic terms for nutritional
compounds;”61 in contrast, such a marketplace practice no doubt had
influenced consumer perceptions that the “B-100” mark in the earlier
case was descriptive.62
In 2010, the Western District of New York classified “NYSEG”—
the abbreviation for “New York State Electric & Gas Corp.”—as a
suggestive mark.63 The court ignored the conflicting authorities from the
Southern District; for support, it cited precedents from other circuits
which had recognized that abbreviations can be arbitrary or suggestive.64
Because “NYSEG” was registered and incontestable, the defendant did
not challenge its validity, only its strength.65 Even though the
underlying phrase (which was unregistered) was merely descriptive and

60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 54 n.4.
62. A later case from the Eastern District involved the incontestable “AAA” mark for the
American Automobile Association. The defendant conceded that the mark was arbitrary, and the
court did not consider the trademark status of the underlying expression. Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc. v.
AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97 CV 1180 SJ, 1999 WL 97918 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999).
63. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Gas & Elec., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 2d 415, 435-36
(W.D.N.Y. 2010). “A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea
of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.” Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964
F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
64. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1984)
(acronym is suggestive if “some operation of the imagination” is necessary to equate the initials
with the product); Vertos Med., Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09-1411, 2009 WL 3740709, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) (“MILD,” which stood for generic phrase “minimally invasive lumbar
decompression,” “d[id] not suggest anything to do with spinal surgery,” and, therefore, was
arbitrary); Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 166,
176 (D. Mass. 2009) (“ABLE,” for “Ability Based on Long Experience” was suggestive and “at
least moderately strong”); Savannah Coll. of Art and Design, Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929,
931-32 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“The SCAD mark is distinctive and arbitrary . . . in as much as it is an
acronym for the college's full name, ‘Savannah College of Art and Design’”).
65. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
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had “no more than moderate strength” through secondary meaning,66 the
court concluded that “NYSEG” was suggestive:
That the letters of the acronym stand for words that are themselves
descriptive does not mean that the acronym is likewise descriptive.
Although “NYS” probably connotes “New York State” to most adults
rather quickly, the combination “EG” does not seem likely to
immediately convey to a person that it refers to electricity and gas.67

It is unlikely that consumers would have attempted to pronounce
“NYSEG” as a word, nor does it resemble any existing word so as to
conjure up a dictionary meaning. (If it did, the court might have ruled
that it was arbitrary rather than suggestive). Thus, the Western District’s
ruling cannot be reconciled with Programmed Tax Systems68 and
American Optical69 on the basis of pronunciation or dictionary-word
resemblance.
Whither the Second Circuit? With no appellate guidance other than
Blisscraft,70 the district courts in this circuit have been unable or
unwilling to develop a consistent body of law with respect to
abbreviations, either circuit-wide or even within the prolific and
trademark-savvy Southern District of New York.
2. Seventh Circuit: “Heavy Burden” on Trademark Proponent
The Seventh Circuit initially adopted the Modern Optics71
approach, but in more recent cases has imposed a greater burden on the
trademark proponent.
The Circuit’s early approach is illustrated by FS Services, Inc. v.
Custom Farm Services, Inc.,72 where the court held that “abbreviations
for generic terms where they are generally recognized must be treated
similarly.”73 Applying this rule, the court found that the abbreviation
“FS” had come to signify “farm service” or “farm supply” to the farmers

66. Id.
67. Id. at 436 (emphasis in original).
68. Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
69. Am. Optical Corp. v. Am. Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
70. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
71. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
72. FS Servs., Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972). An even earlier
precedent, Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n of Chicago, 81 F. Supp. 127
(N.D. Ill. 1948), dealt with the trademark status of “Metropolitan” as well as its abbreviation “Met.”
but found both of them to be well-recognized marks. Id. at 133.
73. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 674 (emphasis added).
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within the area where both parties conducted business.74 Because both
of these phrases were descriptive or generic, the court concluded that
“FS” was itself descriptive or generic.75
Ten years later, however, the Seventh Circuit departed from this
approach. In National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal
Studies, Inc.,76 (“NCBE”) the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s
unregistered “MBE” mark was generic solely because the underlying
term from which it was derived, “Multistate Bar Examination,” was
itself generic. Unlike FS Services,77 the NCBE court did not consider
whether “MBE” was in fact generally recognized as having generic
significance.78 Instead, the court held:
Under settled trademark law if the components of a trade name are
common descriptive terms, a combination of such terms retains that
quality. We note further that plaintiffs also use the initials “MBE” to
designate their test is of no consequence. Abbreviations for generic or
common descriptive phrases must be treated similarly.79

With no further explanation, the NCBE decision appeared to abandon the
rule of FS Services,80 and the Modern Optics81 rule long embraced by the
CCPA and the TTAB, by eliminating the requirement that, to be generic,
the abbreviation must itself be generally recognized by the relevant
public as having generic significance.82
Seven years later, the Seventh Circuit altered its approach yet
again, turning the seemingly-absolute rule of NCBE into a rebuttable
presumption, albeit one which is difficult to overcome. In G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,83 the court applied this
presumption in refusing to recognize the abbreviation “LA” as a
common law trademark for beer with a low alcohol content. In the
opinion below, the district court had applied NCBE to hold that the
initials “LA” were descriptive solely because they stood for the
descriptive and protectable phrase “low alcohol”: “[I]nitials are merely
74. Id.
75. Id. Although the plaintiff held several trademark registrations for variations on the “FS”
mark, none of these involved the letters by themselves. Id. at 673.
76. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1982).
77. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 671.
78. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, 692 F.2d at 488.
79. Id. (citing FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 674).
80. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 671.
81. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
82. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, 692 F.2d at 488.
83. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
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short forms of the words for which they stand and should be accorded
the same degree of protection as those words.”84 The district court
distinguished the Merritt Forbes85 case from the Southern District of
New York because the abbreviation in that case “formed an acronym,
TOP’s.”86 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to hold that the district
court’s statement of the law was legal error per se.87 Nonetheless, the
appellate court went on to articulate a somewhat different rule, holding
that initials are rebuttably presumed to convey the same meaning to the
public as the underlying words they represent:
As a practical matter, there must be a presumption that initials mean,
or will soon come to mean, to the public the descriptive phrase from
which they are derived. Although the matter is certainly not
foreclosed, there is a heavy burden on a trademark claimant seeking to
show an independent meaning of initials apart from the descriptive
words which are their source.88

Placing such a “heavy burden” on the trademark proponent, the court
explained, was justified by “the policy of the trademark laws to guard
against unjustified appropriation from the public domain of terms
needed to perform a descriptive function,” and by “the general rule that
the claimant of trademark law protection bears the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that an unregistered mark is entitled
to trademark status.”89
Even as it imposed a “heavy burden” on the trademark proponent
seeking to establish trademark significance for the abbreviation of a
generic phrase, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its analysis was
focused on situations where the public encounters both the initials and
the underlying phrase in a way that establishes a connection between the
two.90 Nonetheless, the court speculated that only rarely would the
public encounter initials without associating them with an underlying
expression.91
84. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1493 n.48
(E.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th
Cir. 1989).
85. Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. G. Heileman Brewing, 676 F. Supp. at 1493 n.48.
87. G. Heileman Brewing, 873 F.2d at 994.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Even if consumers did not initially make the connection, the court suggested, they might
do so in the future:
It is possible, although not likely, that the public might become acquainted with initials
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When that “rare” instance occurred twelve years later, however, in
CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc.,92 the Seventh Circuit treated
“CAE” as a “strong and distinctive” mark,93 without citing any of its
prior rulings on abbreviations, and without even considering the strength
or distinctiveness of the underlying phrase. As used by the owner of the
registered mark, the abbreviation originally stood for “Canadian
Aviation Electronics,” and as used by the applicant (who sought to
register the same mark for different goods and services), it stood for
“Clean Air Engineering.” The Court of Appeals held that the registered
“CAE” mark “is an unpronounceable set of letters and thus falls into the
category of letter marks generally accorded broader trademark protection
because ‘it is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged
letters than it is to remember words, figures, phrases or syllables.’”94 The
court found this principle to be “particularly applicable here because the
letters CAE appear without reference to the underlying words from
which they were originally derived.”95 The court’s failure to apply the
more rigorous analysis of its prior cases to the abbreviation at issue in
this case may reflect the failure of both parties to brief the issue, since
both the registrant/opposer and the applicant wanted the mark to be
protected. It also reflects a muddling of two factors relevant to the
likelihood of confusion analysis: the strength of the senior mark, and the
degree of similarity between the senior and junior marks.

used in connection with a product without ever being aware that the initials were derived
from, and stood for, a descriptive phrase or generic name. This is conceivable, though
rather improbable, because the connection between the initials and the descriptive words
is in normal course very likely to become known. The process of identifying initials with
the set of descriptive words from which they are derived is, after all, usually fairly
simple. Ordinarily, no flight of imagination or keen logical insight is required. There is
a natural assumption that initials do generally stand for something. All that needs to be
done is to convert the next-to-obvious to the obvious by answering the inevitable
question: What do the initials stand for? As a rule, no very extensive or complicated
process of education or indoctrination is required to convey that initials stand for
descriptive words.
Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
92. 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2001).
93. Id. at 685.
94. Id. at 684 (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
23:33, at 23-97 (2001), and citing Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding TMS and TMM confusingly similar)).
95. Id.
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3. Eighth Circuit: Embracing Modern Optics
On facts similar to G. Heileman Brewing,96 the Eighth Circuit
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach, holding in Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Stroh Brewery Co.97 that initials may be suggestive even where they
stand for an underlying descriptive or generic phrase. Based on
consumer survey evidence, the district court in this case found that the
“LA” mark for low alcohol beer was suggestive rather than descriptive
or generic:
In this Court’s opinion, a term should not be equated with generic or
descriptive phrases merely because the individual letters of the term
may be interpreted to be initials of that generic or descriptive phrase.
As explained more fully below, the real test is the consumer's
perception of such term.
...
[I]t is this Court's opinion that the study supports a conclusion that
“LA”, when placed prominently on a can of beer as the sole brand
name, stands for an idea which requires some operation of the
imagination to connect it with the product, and therefore is suggestive
in nature.98

Citing Modern Optics99 with approval,100 the Eighth Circuit agreed with
the district court that initials, like other types of marks, are suggestive
when “some operation of the imagination is required” to connect the
initials with the product.101 Defendant Stroh had argued that this holding
was legal error, because initials which stand for a phrase that is generic
or merely descriptive should be equated with that phrase as a matter of
law.102 Rejecting this, the appellate court held that “if some operation of
the imagination is required to connect the initials with the product, the
initials cannot be equated with the generic phrase but are suggestive in
nature, thereby rendering them protectable.”103 In contrast to the
Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit did not suggest that such a scenario
would be rare or improbable.104

96. G. Heileman Brewing, 873 F.2d at 985.
97. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984).
98. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 587 F. Supp. 330, 335, 337 (E.D. Mo. 1984),
aff’d, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984).
99. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
100. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 750 F.2d at 636.
101. Id. at 635-36.
102. Id. at 635.
103. Id. at 635-36.
104. Id.
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A recent district court decision in Minnesota presented the
abbreviation question in reverse. In American Ass’n for Justice v.
American Trial Lawyers Ass’n,105 the defendant challenged the validity
of the common law trademark “Association of Trial Lawyers of
America” (which the plaintiff was transitioning away from but had not
yet abandoned), but did not challenge the validity of the plaintiff’s
registered mark, “ATLA.”106 The court found that consumers did not
distinguish between the initials “ATLA” and the underlying phrase; the
evidence indicated that consumers perceived the two marks as
interchangeable source indicators.107 The court briefly examined the
underlying phrase to determine whether it was suggestive or descriptive,
but undertook no such analysis of the abbreviation.108 Nor did the court
distinguish between the abbreviation and the underlying phrase in
determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion with the
defendant’s “American Trial Lawyers Association” mark.109 This
approach seems inconsistent with the court’s conclusion that consumers
perceived both “ATLA” and “Association of Trial Lawyers of America”
as indicating the same source; if that were true, then by conceding that
the abbreviation was a valid mark, the defendant also conceded that the
underlying phrase was a valid mark.110
While other district court decisions in the Eighth Circuit have
addressed abbreviation marks, they have involved abbreviations that
were registered marks; thus, the analysis in those cases has been
truncated due to the presumption of validity.111

105. Am. Ass’n for Justice v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1144 (D. Minn.
2010).
106. Id. at 1141.
107. Id. at 1144.
108. Id. at 1142.
109. Id. at 1144 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, 873 F.2d 985, 994
(7th Cir. 1989)).
110. Id.
111. In Community of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Miller, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1316
(W.D. Mo. 2007), a district court summarily rejected a genericness challenge to the incontestable
marks “RLDS” and “Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints” without making any
separate analysis of the abbreviation. Deference went a bit too far, however, in Hubbs Machinery &
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brunson Instrument Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2009),
where the district court refused to invalidate the registered mark “SM,” which stood for the generic
phrase “sphere mount,” on the erroneous ground that genericness cannot invalidate a registered
mark.
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4. Fourth Circuit: Erratic Decisionmaking
The inconsistency of the decisions on abbreviation marks that have
emerged from courts in the Fourth Circuit rivals that of the Second
Circuit.
The early cases offered little useful guidance. In the 1970 case of
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet,112 the Fourth Circuit
considered a mark—“comsat,” used for the plaintiff’s communications
satellite services—that was a cross between a coined word and an
abbreviation. Because the component “com” is associated with a variety
of concepts (computers, community, communication), the court held that
it was not uniquely associated with communications; accordingly,
“comsat” was not descriptive.113
In America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp.,114 an obtusely-reasoned
2001 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that “IM” (for “instant
messaging”) was not generic, but was nonetheless not an enforceable
mark. Finding substantial evidence of widespread generic use of the
term “IM” to refer to instant messaging regardless of source, the court
held that this evidence outweighed AOL’s conclusory assertions that the
term was uniquely associated with its own messaging service.115 While
the district court explicitly held that both IM and “instant message” were
generic,116 the Fourth Circuit declined to hold that IM was generic, but
held—without explanation—that IM was “unenforceable” as a mark.117
In 2004, a district court in the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the
Modern Optics118 approach, holding in U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops v. Media Research Center119 that initials which stand for
descriptive phrases are themselves inherently descriptive: “Initials for a
descriptive phrase merely represent short forms of the words for which
they stand and should receive the same degree of protection as those

112. Commc’ns Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970).
113. Id. at 1248.
114. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding district
court’s conclusion that abbreviation “IM” for instant messaging lacked trademark significance
because it was synonymous with the service itself), cert. dismissed, Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T, 534
U.S. 946 (2001).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
119. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Media Research Ctr., 432 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D.
Va. 2006).
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words.”120 Accordingly, the court held that “CNS” was descriptive
simply because it stood for the descriptive phrase “Catholic News
Service.”121 When the plaintiff pointed out that the TTAB had found
“CNS” to be inherently distinctive, the court observed:
[T]he TTAB, as it expressly acknowledged in its decision, was
constrained to follow Modern Optics regardless of whether that case
has received favorable treatment from other Courts of Appeals. In
fact, courts in this Circuit have adopted the legal standard established
in Heileman to determine whether trademarks consisting solely of
initials qualify for protection under the Lanham Act. Even the case
[Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp.] that Plaintiff cites as evidence that
this Court relies upon the Modern Optics test for evaluating the
protectability of initial marks in fact adopted the Heileman test and
cited with approval other cases from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
that did the same. As discussed above, since “Catholic News Service”
is merely descriptive, the initials for that name are likewise merely
descriptive and will receive protection only upon a showing of
secondary meaning.122

Despite this attempt at a strong doctrinal pronouncement, no court
in the Fourth Circuit (or elsewhere) has ever cited Catholic Bishops for
this proposition.123 Indeed, subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions reveal
the circuit’s continuing confusion over the analytical framework for
abbreviations. In its 2009 decision in George & Co. v. Imagination
Entertainment Ltd.,124 the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow the general
path of Catholic Bishops,125 assessing an abbreviation without regard to
consumer perception. George & Co. involved the registered mark
“LCR,” which stood for “LEFT CENTER RIGHT.”126 In finding that
the abbreviation was suggestive, the court of appeals reluctantly deferred
to the judgment of the PTO and the district court only because the
infringement defendant offered no evidence of descriptiveness to rebut
the presumption of distinctiveness that arose from the PTO’s registration
120. Id. at 623 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp.
1436, 1493 (E.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873
F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 625 (citation omitted).
123. Catholic Bishops has been cited only once, and for a different proposition. See Field of
Screams, LLC v. Olney Boys & Girls Cmty. Sports Ass’n, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25634, at *27 (D.
Md. Mar. 14, 2011).
124. George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 395 nn.11-12 (4th Cir.
2009).
125. Catholic Bishops, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
126. George & Co., 575 F.3d at 395 nn.11-12.
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of the mark without evidence of secondary meaning.127 However, the
appellate court expressed doubt as to the correctness of their
conclusions, noting that “LEFT CENTER RIGHT” is “a descriptive
term” that describes “a generic dice game,” and that the PTO “has
repeatedly found LEFT CENTER RIGHT descriptive.”128 The court
thus implied that LCR itself was either descriptive or generic, but it
seemed to draw this conclusion simply from the nature of the underlying
phrase, rather than considering how LCR was actually used or perceived
by the relevant consumers.129
In contrast, another 2009 decision by the Fourth Circuit focused
squarely on consumer perception, although the result was to find the
abbreviation unprotectable—the same result that would have followed if
the court had focused on the underlying expression. In OBX-Stock, Inc.
v. Bicast, Inc.,130 the court held that OBX, a registered trademark which
the registrant had coined as an abbreviation for the Outer Banks of North
Carolina, was perceived by consumers as synonymous with the Outer
Banks, and not as a source indicator for any goods or services; thus, the
abbreviation was geographically descriptive and lacked secondary
meaning. Although the court declined to cancel the registrations,131 it
noted that its holding would prevent the mark from becoming
incontestable. Apparently the registrant had initially been rebuffed in its
efforts to register OBX. However, the PTO eventually bowed to
political pressure from North Carolina’s congressional delegation and
granted the registrations in violation of its own well-established
standards.132 The PTO’s obvious error of judgment no doubt explains
the court’s willingness to overcome the presumption of validity that
attaches to registered marks. It seems clear that the Fourth Circuit
would have found the mark in this case invalid whether it focused on the
abbreviation itself or on the underlying expression.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 395 n.12.
129. Id.
130. OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2009).
131. This was partly on procedural grounds (i.e., the defendant failed to file a counterclaim for
cancellation) and partly because, in the court’s view, the defendant’s “evidence d[id] not
conclusively establish that every one of” the plaintiff’s registrations should be cancelled. Id. at 34243.
132. Id. at 342.
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5. First Circuit: Treating Abbreviations Independently
In the First Circuit, courts have analyzed the distinctiveness of
abbreviations independently of the underlying expression. None of these
opinions clearly articulates a presumption for or against trademark
protection, or expressly addresses the respective burdens of proof of the
parties advocating or opposing protection. The opinions are largely
consistent with Modern Optics,133 with some minor departures.
In Grove Laboratories. v. Brewer & Co.,134 a decision predating
Modern Optics,135 Breth,136 and Martell,137 the First Circuit reversed its
own conclusion as to the distinctiveness of a mark consisting of the
initials “LBQ” (standing for “laxative bromo quinine”) enclosed in a
circle. In the initial hearing, the First Circuit held that the abbreviation
was descriptive because the underlying phrase was descriptive, and
because the underlying phrase appeared together with the abbreviation
on the labels of medicine bottles.138 In a subsequent review, however,
the court concluded that its prior conclusion was erroneous, and that the
mark was arbitrary or fanciful despite the descriptiveness of the
underlying phrase:
The letters as thus arranged and embossed on the tablets are not in
themselves descriptive of the ingredients which the tablets contain, but
are arbitrary and fanciful. It is only when they are used on the labels in
association with the words ‘Laxative Bromo Quinine’ that one is led to
inquire whether they may or may not be descriptive. But being
arbitrary and fanciful when adopted and embossed upon the tablets we
think that they do not lose that character when printed on the label,
enclosed in a circle.139

This analysis anticipates both Modern Optics140 and the Second Circuit’s
Blisscraft141 decision; the fact that the abbreviation was sometimes
accompanied by the underlying descriptive phrase was relevant to the
analysis, but it was not conclusive, serving only to prompt an “inquiry”

133. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
134. Grove Labs. v. Brewer & Co., 103 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1939).
135. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504.
136. Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 4 (Com’r Pat. &
Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943).
137. Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, Distillerie De La Liqueur De
L’Ancienne Abbaye De Fecamp, 116 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
138. Id. at 178.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504.
141. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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into descriptiveness.142 Although the court did not expressly articulate a
presumption for or against trademark protection for abbreviations, it
seems to have tacitly embraced a presumption in favor of such
protection, rebuttable by proof of descriptiveness.143
More recently, the First Circuit was asked to decide whether the
term “duck” was generic for a tour in an amphibious vehicle. The term
“duck” is a colloquial term commonly substituted for the abbreviation
DUKW, which refers to a class of World War II amphibious vehicles
made by General Motors and first deployed by the U.S. military in 1942
(and pronounced the same as “duck”).144 DUKW itself is not, strictly
speaking, an acronym, but it is the abbreviation that was adopted (by the
Army or GM, depending on the source) to identify this class of
vehicles.145 The “D” stands for 1942, “U” for utility, “K” for either
front-wheel drive or 6-wheel drive or all-wheel drive, depending on the
source, and “W” for two powered rear axles.146 In Boston Duck Tours,
LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC,147 the district court had concluded that
“duck” was not generic for the service of offering tours in such vehicles,
because the tours did not involve the creatures known as ducks. The
First Circuit held that this was clear error.148 Instead of analyzing
whether the term “duck” was generic, the appellate court held that the
district court should have analyzed the entire term “duck tours.”149
Because the term “duck tours” was widely used generically to refer to
tours utilizing these amphibious vehicles,150 the phrase was generic.
In a discussion of abbreviations, this case is, to be sure, an “odd
duck.” Both the district court and the appellate court focused on the
meaning of the word “duck” rather than on the abbreviation for which it
was a phonetically-identical substitute.151 Yet both opinions are still
consistent with the Modern Optics152 approach. The average consumer
was probably not even aware of the expression DUKW, much less the
generic or description terms which it abbreviated. To the average
consumer, a “duck” was a common water-bird; this meaning was

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 4

9-LAFRANCE MACRO FINAL.DOCM

224

2/24/2012 9:32 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[45:201

reinforced by the logos and other graphics used by duck tour services,
several of which featured cartoon-like ducks.153 Thus, neither the
consumers nor the courts equated the term with the generic expression
from which it was derived.154
As in other circuits, the presumption of validity that attaches to
registered marks has influenced decisions in the First Circuit regarding
abbreviations for generic phrases.155
6. D.C. Circuit: Rejecting Modern Optics
In a 1924 decision that appeared to anticipate the Modern Optics156
approach, the D.C. Circuit held that the initials “MM” were descriptive
specifically because they always appeared together with “malted milk”
on the trademark owner’s product label, because this juxtaposition made
clear to consumers what the initials stood for. 157
In 1989, however, the Circuit implicitly rejected Modern Optics,158
concluding in Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans
Foundation159 that the initials “BVA” were generic simply because the
phrase for which they stood (“Blinded Veterans Association”) was itself
generic. The district court’s analysis of the marks, while brief, had
assessed the distinctiveness of both marks, concluding that while both of
them were descriptive, both had been used in a manner that gave rise to
secondary meaning:
Plaintiff BVA has, from its inception, been known by no other name.
It has employed its initials as a logo, on its official publication and
elsewhere, for the same period. And it has continuously promoted

153. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 8.
154. A subsequent district court decision, Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. National
Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2009), also involved an acronym with a wordequivalent. The plaintiff’s unregistered mark, “ABLE,” stood for “Ability Based on Long
Experience.” The court held that “ABLE” was both suggestive, id. at 171-72, and “at least
moderately strong,” id. at 176, and this conclusion was not altered by the mark’s acronym status.
The court did not analyze the distinctiveness of the underlying phrase. Id. at 172. If it had, it seems
unlikely that the court would have held it to be descriptive or generic as to the plaintiff’s services
(helping older workers find employment).
155. E.g., Diomed, Inc. v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-12498 RWZ, 2006 WL
516756 (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2006) (although evidence was mixed as to whether doctors used “EVLT”
as a generic term for “endovenous laser therapy (or treatment),” as a registered mark the
abbreviation was presumptively valid; also, defendant implicitly conceded it was valid even though
the underlying term was generic).
156. Modern Optics Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
157. Horlick’s Malted Milk Co. v. Borden Co., 295 F. 232 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
158. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504.
159. 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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itself, without hiatus, as the preeminent private voluntary proponent of
the interests of blinded former U.S. service personnel, and its
‘product,’ i.e., the services it can render to and for them, for such a
length of time, and at such effort and expense, that the Court concludes
the name ‘Blinded Veterans Association,’ and the initials ‘BVA,’ have,
indeed, acquired a secondary meaning for which BVA is entitled to
protection against all competitors employing a name which is
confusingly similar. The Court is reinforced in that conclusion by both
the defendant's startling success in its maiden fundraising venture with
no history of significant accomplishment, and by the tenacity with
which it seeks to preserve its right to use the name it has chosen for
160
itself.

In rejecting this analysis, the D.C. Circuit explained its position in a
brief and conclusory footnote, citing only the Seventh Circuit’s decisions
in NCBE161 and FS Services162:
“We need not deal separately with the question whether the initials
‘BVA’ are generic; if the full name is generic, an abbreviation is treated
similarly.”163 It is clear that the D.C. Circuit gave no serious thought to
the question of whether and how abbreviations can achieve independent
trademark status.164
7. Eleventh Circuit: Burdening the Trademark Proponent
As discussed below, district court decisions involving abbreviations
in the Eleventh Circuit have been inconsistent and occasionally
downright bizarre. However, a 2007 decision at the appellate level may
have stabilized the law of the Circuit.
In one of the oddest district court decisions involving abbreviations,
the Middle District of Florida held in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. A-B
Distributors, Inc.165 that Anheuser-Busch’s “A-B” mark was descriptive.
The A-B court relied in part on the reasoning of the Southern District of
New York in American Optical, which held that initials are “letters in

160. Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Found., 680 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D.D.C. 1988),
vacated and remanded, 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
161. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs & Educ. Testing Serv. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982).
162. FS Servs., Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972).
163. Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1041 n.12.
164. Despite its poverty of analysis, this part of the court’s holding was cited with approval by
the Fifth Circuit in Society of Finanial Examiners v. National Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners,
41 F.3d 223, 226 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995), discussed in the text accompanying notes 248-53 infra.
165. 910 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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the alphabet available for use by anyone.”166 Although the Florida court
also stated the reasonable proposition that initials are descriptive if they
impart information directly,167 it held that “A-B” was a descriptive mark
even though it did not convey any information about the qualities of the
product (beer) with which it was associated. The court reached this
conclusion without ever considering whether the underlying phrase
“Anheuser-Busch” was itself descriptive.168 (It might be viewed as such,
if consumers perceive both parts of the name as surnames; if not, it could
be fanciful.). Under this “alphabet” approach, a court could treat initials
as descriptive even if they abbreviated a fanciful or arbitrary mark.169
Three years later, however, the same district court addressed the
memorable acronym “BEARS,” which stood for “British-EuropeanAmerican Racing Series.”
The court held that the acronym’s
distinctiveness should be examined separately from that of the
underlying expression; based on evidence of consumer perception,
“BEARS” was an arbitrary mark even though the underlying phrase was
descriptive.170 This decision, American Historic Racing Motorcycle
Ass’n, Ltd. v. Team Obsolete Promotions (“AHRMA”),171 was affirmed
without opinion by the Eleventh Circuit in 2000.172 The district court
undertook a detailed analysis of the “BEARS” mark, and considered the
leading precedents from the TTAB and CCPA as well as the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits:
BEARS is an arbitrary mark rather than a descriptive mark for several
reasons. On its face, BEARS does not convey the phrase, BritishAmerican-European Racing Series. Unlike an abbreviation such as
MBE, which stands for Multistate Bar Examination, BEARS doubles
for an animal and an abbreviation. Consequently, a consumer who
sees BEARS in connection with motorcycle racing may associate the
word with any number of things, and not immediately think that
BEARS is an abbreviation. This is particularly true because, aside
from the AHRMA rulebook and articles discussing BEARS, the

166. Id. at 593.
167. Id. (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 996-97 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycle Ass’n, LTD. v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d
1000, 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, 233 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2000).
171. Id.
172. Am. Historic Racing, 233 F.3d 577.
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promotional materials do not feature BEARS together with its
underlying phrase.173

Finally, the evidence showed that motorcycle racing fans in fact
perceived “BEARS” not as a generic motorcycle racing class but as a
mark for the plaintiff’s entertainment services;174 rather than treating this
as evidence of secondary meaning (which would be essential to validity
if the mark were descriptive), the court held that this evidence of
consumer perception supported its conclusion that the “BEARS” mark
was arbitrary.175 Ironically, the district court in AHRMA cited the A-B
case for the proposition that “[a]n abbreviation is treated similarly to its
underlying phrase where the abbreviation imparts the original generic or
descriptive connotation,”176 a proposition that is neither supported nor
articulated in the A-B decision.
Consumer perceptions in this case were clearly influenced by the
fact that “BEARS” conjures up the image of an animal.177 This strong
association probably overwhelmed any consumer awareness that
“BEARS” was an acronym at all, thus making it irrelevant whether the
underlying phrase was descriptive or even generic. On the other hand, if
the underlying phrase were very familiar to the relevant consumers, then
arguably the mental association with bears and the mental association
with the descriptive or generic meaning of the underlying phrase would
co-exist—in the minds of different consumers or even within the mind
of an individual consumer. In that case, it would be less clear that
“BEARS” should be treated as an arbitrary mark. The situation would
be analogous to other dual-purpose marks, such as those which have
both functional and nonfunctional aspects,178 or those which are
perceived as generic by some consumers but not by others.179 At the
very least, AHRMA illustrates the same phenomenon seen in the
Blisscraft180 (“Poly Pitcher”) and Merritt Forbes181 (“TOP’s”) opinions

173. Am. Historic Racing, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1004.
177. Id. at 1005.
178. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
203-04 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that cheerleaders’ uniforms had both functional and nonfunctional
features).
179. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579-80 (2d Cir.
1963) (finding that substantial majority of public perceived “thermos” as generic, but minority still
perceived it as a trademark).
180. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
181. Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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from the Second Circuit and, to a lesser degree, the Boston Duck
Tours182 (“DUCK”) opinion from the First Circuit183—if the
abbreviation constitutes (or at least conjures up) a word that does not
itself describe the goods in question, then courts will treat the trademark
status of the underlying expression as irrelevant.
The Eleventh Circuit finally addressed abbreviations at the
appellate level in the 2007 case of Welding Services, Inc. v. Forman.184
Its holding in this case supports independent analysis of the abbreviation
and the underlying expression, and appears to strike a middle course
between the Modern Optics185 approach burdening the trademark
opponent and the Seventh Circuit’s “heavy burden” on the trademark
proponent.186
The abbreviation at issue in Welding Services was “WSI,” derived
from “Welding Services, Inc.”187 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
phrase “welding services” was generic, and that the plaintiff had failed
to establish the distinctiveness of “WSI.”188 However, the court did not
hold that “WSI” was generic.189 Instead, the court articulated the
following rule:
“Abbreviations of generic words may become
protectable if the party claiming protection for such an abbreviation
shows that the abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying
words in the mind of the public.”190
The court also noted the Seventh Circuit’s admonition in G.
Heileman Brewing191 that the proponent of trademark protection for an
abbreviation bears a “heavy burden” in demonstrating that the
abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying generic or
descriptive phrase.192 While the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly adopt
or endorse this “heavy burden” rule, and its analysis does not appear to
impose such a burden, its analysis does place the burden of proof on the
trademark proponent, who must establish that the abbreviation conveys

182. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
183. See also Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp.
2d 166 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that “ABLE” was suggestive without even considering the
underlying expression). See supra note 155.
184. 509 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007).
185. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
186. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d 1351.
187. Id. at 1355.
188. Id. at 1360.
189. Id. at 1359.
190. Id.
191. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
192. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1359.
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to consumers a meaning distinct from its underlying expression.193 This
is the opposite of the Modern Optics194 burden of proof.
In the decision below, the district court had found “WSI”
protectable, based on the factors which have traditionally been
considered as circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning: Welding
Services had used the abbreviation since 1990, had spent significant
amounts on advertising, and had generated significant revenues.195
However, the Eleventh Circuit held that this circumstantial evidence of
secondary meaning was insufficient to resolve the question whether
“WSI” had a meaning distinct from the underlying generic phrase:
“[T]he question of whether the abbreviation has a discrete meaning in
the minds of the public from the generic words for which it stands
requires a different kind of evidence.”196 The court did not specify what
this “different kind of evidence” might be.197 It noted merely that “[t]he
only evidence in the record relevant to this question shows Welding
Services has not created a separate meaning for the abbreviation.”198
Welding Services presented only circumstantial evidence to
establish that WSI had secondary meaning—length of use, advertising
expenditures, and sales volume—and this evidence was derived from
marketing materials in which the “WSI” abbreviation was always
displayed immediately next to the words “Welding Services, Inc.”199 In
the Eleventh Circuit’s view, it was, therefore, likely that consumers gave
the abbreviation the same meaning as the generic phrase that it
accompanied. Welding Services failed to submit any evidence—
consumer surveys or testimony, for example—demonstrating that
consumers separately recognized “WSI” as a source indicator. By
always displaying the abbreviation and the generic phrase jointly,
Welding Services was, in effect, teaching consumers to see “WSI” as a
generic term.
Under the Welding Services approach, if the expression underlying
an abbreviation is generic or descriptive, then the circumstantial
evidence which ordinarily helps to establish secondary meaning will be
of little or no value unless the abbreviation is presented to the consumer

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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separately from the underlying expression. 200 Teaching the consumer to
equate the two will be fatal to a claim that the abbreviation is distinctive.
In contrast, under the Second Circuit’s opinions in Standard Brands
(“V-8”) 201 and Blisscraft (“Poly Pitcher”) ,202 marketing materials which
taught consumers the underlying meaning of abbreviations did not
undermine the distinctiveness of those abbreviations.
While the appellate court held that Welding Services had failed to
show that “WSI” was protectable, it stopped short of holding that the
abbreviation was generic.203 Thus, it did not adopt the Seventh Circuit’s
rebuttable presumption that abbreviations for generic terms are
themselves generic. Although the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly
state that it was imposing the “heavy burden” of proof which was
applied in G. Heileman Brewing,204 it did require WSI to provide
secondary meaning evidence that was specific to the “WSI”
abbreviation.205 To satisfy the court, WSI could have supplied direct
evidence of consumer perceptions, such as consumer surveys or direct
consumer testimony.
The Eleventh Circuit did not consider the possibility that “WSI”
was inherently distinctive by virtue of being arbitrary, fanciful, or
suggestive; there is no indication that Welding Services even raised the
issue of inherent distinctiveness.
More recently in 2009, a district court in Florida interpreted
Welding Services206 as adopting the Seventh Circuit’s “heavy burden” of
proof. In Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Systems Technology, Inc.,207
the Middle District of Florida held that “UNS” lacked a meaning distinct
from the descriptive phrase “universal night sight.” Citing Welding
Services,208 G. Heileman Brewing,209 and AHRMA (the “BEARS”

200. This problem has also afflicted sound marks that are an intrinsic feature of the product or
service being advertised, such as alarm sounds and ringtones. E.g., In re Vertex Group LLC, 89
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694 (T.T.A.B. 2009); Nextel Commc’n, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1393 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
201. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945).
202. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
203. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether WSI’s stylized
logo was so lacking in distinction to warrant summary judgment for the defendant on this issue
alone, because it also found that WSI presented insufficient evidence of a likelihood of confusion
between the parties’ marks.
204. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
205. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007).
206. Id. at 1351.
207. 647 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
208. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1351.
209. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 985.
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case),210 the court stated that “[t]he party claiming protection has a
‘heavy burden’ to show an independent meaning for an abbreviation of a
descriptive phrase.” 211
8. Ninth Circuit: A North/South Divide?
Considering the volume and nature of its trademark-related
caseload, the Ninth Circuit’s case law on abbreviation marks is
surprisingly sparse.
The appellate opinions are unreported or
unpublished. The district court decisions are few, and their reasoning is
underdeveloped. The only theme that emerges from these opinions is
that, in California, abbreviations are more likely to be protected by
courts in the Northern District.
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision treating initials as
inherently descriptive in CPP Insurance Agency, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp.212 In a decision that was affirmed without a reported opinion, the
Central District of California held that “CPP,” which stood for the
descriptive phrase “consumer protection plan,” was “by its very nature
descriptive”213: “Initials, especially when they are initials derived from
a corporate name, are descriptive and are entitled to protection only if
they have acquired a secondary meaning.”214 The court offered no
explanation for this bizarre holding.215 Unlike the district courts in the
Second Circuit, the California court did not rely on the public domain
status of the alphabet. Nor did it explain the reasoning behind its
counterintuitive conclusion that descriptiveness was “especially”
inherent in initials derived from corporate names.216
210. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycle Ass’n, Ltd. v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d
1000 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, 233 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2000).
211. Knights Armament Co., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
212. 212 U.S.P.Q. 257 (C.D.Cal.1980), aff’d without opinion, 676 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1982).
213. Id. at 259.
214. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Two subsequent opinions from the Central District conclude, after cursory analyses, that
the abbreviations in question lacked distinctiveness, but the trademark proponent in each case
presented a weak argument. In Aminolabs, Inc. v. Natural Organics, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783
(C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d without opinion, 825 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1987), the Central District held that
“DLPA” was generic for a food supplement consisting of D- and L-phenylalanine, because it was
known in the scientific literature by that abbreviation and the plaintiff did not seem to have
advertised its product, thus making it unlikely that consumers could develop any perceptions as to
the mark. In Ford Motor Co. v. Ultra Coachbuilders, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356 (C.D. Cal.
2000), aff’d, 238 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpub. mem. opinion), the court held that the
unregistered abbreviation “QVM” was descriptive merely because it stood for the descriptive phrase
“quality vehicle modifier.” Because the underlying phrase was a “self-laudatory term” describing a
characteristic of Ford’s limousine conversion program, the court assumed that this was equally true
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More recently, the Central District held that the “DMS” component
of “TrackerDMS” (an unregistered mark) was descriptive simply
because “DMS” stood for the descriptive phrase “Dealer Management
Software.”217 In making this conclusory determination, the court did not
discuss any evidence of consumer perceptions.218
In contrast, a 2009 decision from the Northern District of
California, Vertos Medical, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.,219 held that
“MILD,” which stood for the generic phrase “minimally invasive lumbar
decompression,” was an arbitrary mark.220 The court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that at least some of the plaintiff’s marketing
materials explained the acronym’s derivation, and thus arguably
“taught” consumers to equate the acronym with the underlying generic
phrase.221 “MILD” was a registered mark, and the court found that the
defendant’s evidence of genericness was simply insufficient to rebut the
presumption of validity.222 In assessing the strength of the mark, the
court focused entirely on the acronym, disregarding the underlying
phrase.223 Because “MILD” neither described nor suggested “anything
to do with spinal surgery,” the court held that it was arbitrary and
“moderately strong.”224 Reflecting the same phenomenon seen in the
Blisscraft,225 Merritt Forbes,226 and AHRMA227 cases, the fact that the
acronym resembled an actual word which did not describe the product or
service may have displaced the underlying generic phrase from the
consumer’s mind.228 However, nothing in the Vertos opinion indicates
that the court consciously considered this factor.229

of the abbreviation. In this case, the court had no reason to delve deeper into the analysis; the
plaintiff presented a particularly weak case, offering no evidence that the mark had ever been used
as a source indicator.
217. Finance Express LLC v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
218. Id.
219. 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009).
220. Id. at *5.
221. Id. at *3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *5.
224. Id.
225. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961).
226. Merrit Forbes & Co., Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
227. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycles Ass’n v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1000
(M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, Am. Historic v. Team Obsolete, 233 F.3d 577
(11th Cir. 2000).
228. Vertos Medical, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09-1411 PJH, 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 6, 2009).
229. Id.
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In China International Travel Service, Inc. v. China & Asia Travel
Service, Inc., 230 the Northern District held that “CITS,” an unregistered
abbreviation for “China International Travel Services,” was either
arbitrary or suggestive. It gave three reasons: (1) “Acronyms of full
business names are commonly protected as trademarks,” (2) the
defendant had “acknowledged” the inherent distinctiveness of “CITS”
by filing its own trademark registrations for similar marks, and (3) the
“plaintiff ha[d] made long, prominent use” of the mark.231 The court did
not discuss whether the underlying phrase was descriptive, whether the
plaintiff’s marketing materials presented the abbreviation separately
from the underlying phrase, or how consumers actually perceived the
abbreviation.232
In 2011, the Northern District rejected Apple’s attempt to enjoin
Amazon from using the term “App Store,” without even noting that
“App” is an abbreviation for the generic term “application.”233 While
Apple argued that “App Store” is suggestive,234 and Amazon argued that
the phrase is generic,235 the court rejected both characterizations, treating
the phrase as descriptive.236 Some abbreviations, it seems, transcend
their status as abbreviations and enter the lexicon, thus becoming subject
to the same analysis as traditional word marks.
As in other circuits, the presumption of validity that applies to
federally registered abbreviations has generally led the district courts in
the Ninth Circuit to uphold such marks, notwithstanding the
descriptiveness of the underlying phrases.237 Therefore, if Apple
succeeds in its effort to obtain a federal service mark registration for
“App Store,”238 a court will be even more likely to ignore the origin of
“App” as an abbreviation of a generic term.
230. No. 08–cv–01293 JSW (MEJ), 2008 WL 5480840 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008).
231. Id. at *6-7.
232. Id.
233. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C 11-1327 PJH, 2011 WL 2638191 (N.D. Cal. July
6, 2011).
234. Id. at *2-3.
235. Id. at *5.
236. Id. at *7.
237. Ricks v. BMEzine.com, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-01174-PMP-GWF, 2010 WL 2985795 (D.
Nev. July 26, 2010) (upholding registered mark “BME” for “body modification ezine” because
defendant failed to prove that consumers perceived it simply as shorthand for a generic expression);
Vertos Med., Inc. v Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09–1411 PJH, 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6,
2009) (finding insufficient evidence to rebut presumption of validity for registered mark MILD,
even though it stood for descriptive phrase “mildly invasive lumbar decompression”).
238. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77525433 (filed July 17, 2008). Microsoft is
opposing the registration, on the ground that “App Store” is generic. U.S. Trademark Opposition
Serial No. 91195582 (filed July 6, 2010).
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9. Fifth Circuit: Possible Rejection of Modern Optics
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit offers little jurisprudence
on the trademark analysis of abbreviations. Courts at both the district
and appellate levels have addressed the trademark status of the American
Automobile Association’s registered and incontestable “AAA” mark
without ever considering whether consumers perceived it as the
equivalent of the underlying phrase. A 1985 district court decision held
that the mark was arbitrary, 239 and in an unrelated 1991 decision240 the
Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion with little analysis. The 1991
case was poorly argued on the defendant’s side,241 which may explain
the appellate court’s complete failure to consider whether consumers
perceived “AAA” as an abbreviation for the name of the automobile
club or simply as a self-laudatory term (i.e., descriptive),242 or whether
the name of the automobile club was itself descriptive or generic.
Skirting these issues, the Fifth Circuit simply stated that “AAA” was not
generic because it “is not a class of services, but instead identifies the
source of those services.”243 While both opinions, in effect, evaluated
“AAA” independently of the underlying expression, which would be
consistent with Modern Optics,244 they are such weak precedents that
they cannot be seen as reliable indicators of the prevailing law in this
Circuit.245
Moreover, a later opinion from the Fifth Circuit could be read as
rejecting Modern Optics.246 In Society of Financial Examiners v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners,247 the court addressed an
infringement claim involving the federally registered “CFE” designation,
used by one party to signify “Certified Financial Examiner” and by
another to signify “Certified Fraud Examiner.” The court held that
material facts needed to be resolved in order to determine whether
239. American Automobile Ass’n (Inc.) v. AAA Insurance Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.
Tex. 1985), held that AAA was arbitrary in connection with insurance services, because it was
neither suggestive nor descriptive of those services, nor a generic term for such services. At no
point did the court consider the distinctiveness of the underlying phrase, American Automobile
Association, or whether consumers perceived AAA as the equivalent of that phrase.
240. Am. Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1991).
241. Sadly, the appellee’s brief speaks for itself. See Brief for Appellee, Am. Auto. Ass’n v.
AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-8233), 1990 WL 10083387.
242. Self-laudatory terms are generally treated as descriptive. See Platinum Home Mortg.
Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 1998).
243. Am. Auto. Ass’n, 930 F.2d at 1121.
244. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
245. See supra notes 241-43.
246. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d at 504.
247. 41 F.3d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995).
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“CFE” was perceived as a source indicator or as a designation of a
person’s professional qualifications (in which case, the court noted, it
would be generic).248 The appellate court did not reach its own
conclusion as to the distinctiveness of the designation, but quoted
cryptically from Blinded Veterans Ass’n, the D.C. Circuit’s 1989
opinion rejecting Modern Optics249: “We need not deal separately with
the question whether the initials [“CFE”] are generic; if the full name is
generic, an abbreviation is treated similarly.”250 While the court did not
expressly offer an opinion on the appropriateness of this rule, the citation
certainly implies approval.251 Also noteworthy is the court’s willingness
to question the distinctiveness of a federally registered service mark,
despite the statutory presumption of validity; the court seemed doubtful
of the mark’s ability to indicate source, although it acknowledged that
the possibility was “not inconceivable.”252
10. Tenth Circuit: Leaning Toward Blinded Veterans?
A district court in the Tenth Circuit recently adopted the rule of
Blinded Veterans Ass’n,253 holding in Triple-I Corp. v. Hudson Associate
Consulting, Inc. that “Certified Knowledge Manager (CKM)”—a
designation combining an abbreviation and its underlying expression—
was generic.254 Although the mark was registered in Kansas, the
USPTO had refused registration on the ground that it was merely
descriptive.255 While the dispute concerned the combination mark in its
totality, the court nonetheless cited the rule from the D.C. Circuit’s
Blinded Veterans decision as its basis for finding that the “CKM”
portion of the mark was generic.256
In contrast, the same court in the related case of Hudson Associates
Consulting, Inc. v. Weidner257 upheld the federally registered “CKL”
mark (standing for “certified knowledge leader”).
The federal
registration covered the combination mark “Certified Knowledge Leader
CKL,” but the PTO required the registrant to disclaim the underlying
248. Id. at 225.
249. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d at 504.
250. Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs, 41 F.3d at 226 n.5 (quoting Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded
Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1041 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 227.
253. Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 1035.
254. Triple-I Corp. v. Hudson Assocs. Consulting, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D. Kan. 2010).
255. Id. at 1278.
256. Id. at 1284-85 & n.49 (citing Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d 1035 at 1041 n.12).
257. No. 06–2461–EFM, 2010 WL 1946414 (D. Kan. May 14, 2010).
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phrase on the ground that it was merely descriptive;258 thus, the PTO
apparently considered “CKL” to be distinctive even though the
underlying expression was not (and apparently later permitted
registration of “CKL” on its own259). While the defendant presented
some evidence of genericness, the court found this insufficient to
overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to registered
marks.260
11. Sixth Circuit: Too Soon to Tell
In the Sixth Circuit, the distinctiveness of abbreviation marks has
received little attention. Only a single unpublished district court opinion
addresses the issue, but its approach is consistent with Modern Optics.261
In Upjohn Co. v. American Home Products Corp.,262 the owner of the
registered trademark “PROVERA,” a drug containing progesterone (the
naturally occurring progestin), alleged that its mark was infringed by the
defendant’s “PREMPRO” mark, because of the “PRO” component of
both marks. Because “PRO” could be understood as indicating the
presence of progestin in each product, the court considered the
possibility that consumers would perceive “PRO” as generic.263 In this
case, of course, “PRO” functioned both as an abbreviation and as a
prefix/suffix. Rather than automatically equating the abbreviation with
the underlying expression, the court evaluated the distinctiveness of the
abbreviation itself.264 Citing Modern Optics and other PTO precedents
with approval, the court wrote:
Where dictionaries do not define a good by the contraction or
abbreviation, where there is no history of use of the contraction by
consumers, where few other trademarks for the good employ the
contraction, where the term is incongruous to the good, or where the
term does not give tolerably distinct knowledge of the good to a
reasonably informed consumer, the contraction or abbreviation is not
generic or descriptive. Ultimately, these factors get at the question:

258. Id. at *11.
259. Id. at *12 n.90.
260. Id. at *12.
261. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
262. No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996) (unpub.).
263. Id. at *3-*4.
264. “An abbreviation of a generic name which still conveys to the buyer the original generic
connotation of the abbreviated name, is still ‘generic’. . . . However, if the abbreviation is not
recognizable as the original generic term, then the abbreviation is like a fanciful mark and
protectable.” Id. at *6 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 12.12[1]).
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what does the mark mean to the reasonably informed consumer? The
Court assumes that the reasonably informed consumer has seen
relevant promotional material.
Here, no dictionary defines the term “pro-” as denoting progestin. Nor
is there a history among consumers of employing “pro-” as a short
form for progestin. This kind of evidence has been considered prima
facie proof of suggestiveness.
Indeed, “pro-” is so contracted a form of the name progestin that it is
another word entirely. The dictionary definitions for “pro-,” although
not necessarily creatively incongruous, support a finding of
suggestiveness. . . . Such multiple meanings are more in keeping with a
source indicating term than a descriptive or identifying term. Some
exercise of the imagination is required to derive progestin from “pro-.”
. . . There is no evidence indicating “pro-” has fallen into any lexicon
as equivalent to, or directly descriptive of, progestin.265

12. Third Circuit: No Cohesive Approach
The Third Circuit’s jurisprudence on abbreviations is limited to
district court opinions and does not offer anything resembling a cohesive
approach. In a 1976 decision affirmed without opinion by the Third
Circuit, the Delaware district court in Kampgrounds of America, Inc. v.
North Delaware A-OK Campground, Inc.,266 treated the “KOA” mark,
derived from “Kampgrounds of America,” as arbitrary or fanciful:
“Certainly KOA alone is not a ‘meaningful word in common usage’; nor
does it describe the services being offered.”267 Because the KOA mark
was often displayed independently of the underlying phrase, the court
held that the weakness and descriptiveness of that phrase did not affect
the trademark status of the KOA mark.268 Consistent with this approach,
a federal district court in Pennsylvania held in 2004 that the acronym
“CNB,” standing for “County National Bank,” had acquired sufficient

265. Id. at *6-8 (citing Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 506; McCarthy, supra, §§ 11.06[3],
12.12[1]) (additional citations omitted).
266. 415 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del.1976), aff’d without op., 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977).
267. Id. at 1292 (citation omitted). The court recognized that koa is also a type of tree found in
Hawaii, but found that consumers of campground services would be unlikely to make this
association. Id. at 1292 n.7.
268. Id. at 1291-92.
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secondary meaning to be a trademark, even if the underlying phrase was
generic.269
More confusing, however, is AFP Imaging Corp. v. Photo-Therm,
270
Inc., a 1989 opinion in which the New Jersey district court held that
the registered mark “AFP,” as applied to automatic film processing
equipment made by plaintiff AFP Imaging, was not generic. Although it
appears clear that the abbreviation was derived from the phrase
“automatic film processor (or processing),” the opinion does not mention
the provenance of the abbreviation, and it is possible that no evidence
was presented on that point.271 Because the mark was registered, the
burden was on the defendant to present evidence of genericness;
however, the defendant’s argument seems to have been based solely on
the fact that the defendant was using the term in a generic sense.272
Rather than deciding the case based on the burden of proof, the court
based its conclusion on the inscrutable observation that the plaintiff
“use[d] the designation AFP to identify that the product in question is
made by AFP imaging [sic].”273 The court did not even consider the
question of how the “AFP” designation was perceived by the relevant
consumers, which would have been the crucial inquiry under Modern
Optics.274
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
One early trademark authority observed:
Corporate names or parts of these names when used to designate goods
or business houses, or as trade “nicknames” are trade names pure and
simple, in most instances, and can be protected as such. The
commercial nickname, or abbreviated name, is often more valuable, far
better known, and more carefully guarded from use by rivals than the
formal or full name from which it is taken. . . . One hears or sees the
full corporate name used seldom in comparison to the number of times
the nickname is used.275

269. CNB Fin. Corp. v. CNB Cmty. Bank (IO), No. Civ.A. 03–6945(PBT), 2004 WL 2434878,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2004) (unpub.).
270. AFP Imaging Corp. v. Photo-Therm, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (D.N.J. 1989).
271. Id.
272. Id. at *1536.
273. Id. at *1537.
274. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
275. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A & P Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (E.D. Pa.1937)
(quoting HARRY DWIGHT NIMS, NIMS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 246, 170 (3d
ed. 1929)). On trademark protection for consumer-coined nicknames, see Peter M. Brody, What’s
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Whatever the truth of this observation as a matter of branding and
marketing strategy, it is clear that the validity or strength of
abbreviations as trademarks is uncertain when the underlying expression
(be it a corporate name or some other unit of information) does not itself
qualify for trademark protection, or does so only weakly. While it
would be desirable for a uniform rule to emerge from the current array
of competing approaches, such a result is unlikely in the near future.
The application of federal trademark law should in theory be consistent
across the circuits. When it comes to the trademark status of
abbreviations, however, disharmony is the order of the day.
Nonetheless, a few observations emerge from surveying the current
landscape of decisional law.
First, the PTO and CCPA approaches, as exemplified by Modern
Optics,276 are much more favorable to the trademark proponent than the
approaches that have developed in several circuits, most notably the
Seventh Circuit, with its “heavy burden” on the party seeking to
establish the distinctiveness of an abbreviation, and the D.C. Circuit,
with its per se rule that abbreviations of generic terms are necessarily
generic themselves. Thus, in many cases it will be easier to obtain
federal registration for an abbreviation mark than to invoke protection
under common law or under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act277 in the
context of an infringement proceeding. This is ironic, because many
marks that are protectable under section 43(a) or common law are barred
from federal registration.278
Second, despite the skepticism with which abbreviation marks are
viewed in some of the circuits, most courts are reluctant to hold that a
challenger’s evidence of genericism or lack of secondary meaning is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to
federally registered marks.279 This is another reason why trademark
owners should seek federal registration of their abbreviation marks. No

in a Nickname? Or Can Public Use Create Private Rights?, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1123, 1125
(2005).
276. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d 504.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
278. Examples include: (1) personal names of celebrities, entertainers, and sportspeople, (2)
marks that are deemed immoral, scandalous or disparaging, and (3) titles of individual literary,
dramatic, or musical works. See also James E. Harper, Single Literary Titles and Federal
Trademark Protection: The Anomaly Between the USPTO and Case Law Precedents, 45 IDEA 77
(2004). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
279. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a). There are, of course, exceptions. See supra text
accompanying note 254.
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such presumption attaches to unregistered abbreviations,280 thus placing
them at the mercy of each federal court’s individual philosophy. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the statutory presumption of
validity will be weaker in jurisdictions such as the Seventh Circuit,
which places an especially “heavy burden” on the proponent of a mark
that abbreviates a generic or merely descriptive phrase. And even if a
court rules that the presumption of validity has not been overcome, the
court could still hold, in a likelihood of confusion analysis, that the
abbreviation is a weak mark because of its generic or descriptive
associations.
Third, in at least some federal courts, abbreviations of generic or
descriptive phrases seem to have a greater chance of achieving
protection if the abbreviation is an acronym that resembles a word and
thereby conveys a dictionary meaning unrelated to that of the underlying
phrase—for example, “Poly,” “BEARS,” “TOP’s,” “MILD,” and
“ABLE”—as opposed to a mere initialism, like “WSI.”281 The
resemblance to an unrelated word allows consumers to perceive the
acronym as an arbitrary mark, and this may tend to displace the
competing mental association that otherwise connects the acronym to the
underlying generic or descriptive phrase (what the Seventh Circuit called
the “natural assumption that initials do generally stand for
something”282). This will not be helpful, of course, in those instances—
e.g.,“duck,” for amphibious motor vehicles—where the seemingly
arbitrary word has itself suffered genericide, becoming synonymous
with the goods or services.
Finally, in at least some circuits (e.g., the Seventh and Eleventh),
the validity of an abbreviation mark for an underlying generic or
280. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045,
1051 (10th Cir. 2008).
281. The case of the “BADASS” trademark arguably presents an exception, although that
particular acronym has never been challenged as generic or descriptive. Instead, the ordinary
meaning of the term led the trademark examiner to refuse registration on the grounds that the mark
was “scandalous or immoral” under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The T.T.A.B. reversed, largely because
the term was an acronym for “Bettencourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound Systems.” In re Leo
Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978); see Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of
the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) of Trademark Law after
Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 207-08 (2005); Regan Smith, Trademark
Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 451, 461 (2007). However, the Board did not even inquire whether consumers encountering
the mark would actually recognize it as an acronym. The Board also stated that the term was
“susceptible to a wholly innocent pronunciation,” without specifying what that pronunciation was,
and without citing any evidence that consumers actually used the “innocent” pronunciation.
282. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir.
1989).
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descriptive expression will be imperiled to the extent that the labeling
and marketing materials for the goods or services juxtapose the mark
with the generic or descriptive content to which it corresponds. This has
the opposite effect of selecting an acronym that conjures up an arbitrary
word; instead of displacing the mark’s generic or descriptive
associations, this juxtaposition will tend to reinforce those associations,
by “teaching” consumers that the abbreviation is not a source indicator
but an indicator of content. As illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Welding Services,283 where the trademark proponent relies on
circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning to validate the mark, this
failure to distinguish the abbreviation from the underlying generic or
descriptive content can negate the impact of otherwise-persuasive
evidence

283. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007).
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